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Breaching the Mortgage Contract:
The Behavioral Economics of
Strategic Default
64 Vand. L. Rev. 1547 (2011)
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan
Underwater homeowners face a quandary: Should they make
their monthly payments as promised or walk away and save money?
Traditional economic analysis predicts that homeowners will
strategically default (voluntarily enter foreclosure) when it is
cheaper to do so than to keep paying down the mortgage debt. But
this prediction ignores the moral calculus of default, which is
arguably much less straightforward. On the one hand, most people
have moral qualms about breaching their contracts, even when the
financial incentives are clear. On the other hand, the nature of the
lender-borrower relationship is changing and mortgage lenders are
increasingly perceived as remote, profit-obsessed entities
undeserving of moral concern. In the studies reported here, I tease
out three distinct psychological effects of this perception, including
the erosion of reciprocity norms, an increase in social distance, and
the destigmatization of foreclosure. The results have ramifications
for current debates about securitization and modification of
mortgage loans.
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INTRODUCTION

More than a quarter of all American mortgage holders owe
their lenders more than their homes are worth.' These underwater
homeowners face a strange dilemma: What should they do when they
realize that it is cheaper to go into foreclosure than it is to keep paying
down their mortgage debts? American homeowners have rarely faced
this "strategic default" question on such a massive scale. Foreclosure
has historically been reserved for people who were unable to make
payments-because they were unemployed, because their adjustable
interest rate jumped up and they could no longer afford the monthly
payment, or because their household finances suffered some other
shock.2 In the current economy, the equation is quite different:
mortgagees can afford to pay each month, but their total debt swamps
the value of the underlying asset. 3 For many of them, the savings from
walking away would be substantial, 4 but one estimate suggests that
the average homeowner does not default until the value of the house is
sixty-two percent lower than the balance of the mortgage. 5 On its face,
this presents a puzzle. Why do people stay in their homes? And, on the
other hand, when and why do people walk away? This Article argues
that the mortgage commitment implicates powerful norms of promise

1.

John Krainer & Stephen LeRoy, Underwater Mortgages, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF

SAN FRANCISCO ECONOMIC LETTERS (2010), http://www.frbsf.org/publicationseconomicsfletter

/2010/e12010-31.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2011).
2.
See id. (describing the financial hardships that force the typical mortgagor to sell her
home).
3.
See Roger D. Congleton, On the PoliticalEconomy of the FinancialCrisisand Bailout of
2008-2009, 140 PUB. CHOICE 287, 287-89 (2009) (describing the decline in the median asking
prices for homes since Sept. 2007); see also FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, PRELIMINARY STAFF
REPORT: THE MORTGAGE

CRISIS 25 (2010)

[hereinafter

PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT: THE

MORTGAGE CRISIS] (explaining that borrowers typically default on a mortgage if they have both
negative equity and if they experience an income shock).
4.
See Neil Bhutta, Jane Dokko & Hui Shan, The Depth of Negative Equity and Mortgage
Default Decisions 1-3 (Fed. Reserve Bd., FEDS Working Paper No. 2010-35, 2010).
5.
Id. at 2.
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keeping and fair play, and most people think that breaching a contract
is morally wrong. However, the mortgage contract specifies the
consequence of breach (foreclosure) such that underwater borrowers
may see default and foreclosure as the morally neutral exercise of an
option in the contract. The studies reported here ask when people
think of foreclosure as a penalty for a serious legal and moral violation
and when they think that handing over a house is an acceptable
alternate performance of the contractual obligation.
To illustrate the controversy, I begin with an example from the
popular discourse around strategic default. In February 2009 the
moderators of a blog run by the New York Times posted a letter from a
homeowner in California whose home had lost more than half its
value. 6 The homeowner wrote to ask how he should price the hit that
his credit rating would take in the event of default-essentially a
question about the financial cost of poor credit. A vigorous debate
ensued. Most comments ignored the pricing question altogether and
moved directly to the ethical implications of default. "You cut a deal
Forget credit
with another party. You need to live up to that deal ....
7
Or, more
one.
wrote
scores. Do you want to be a cheat and a liar?"
bluntly: "Since you're willing to sacrifice integrity for money, why not
just rent out your wife for a few years and pay off the whole thing very
quickly?" In response, others specifically invoked the notion of the
foreclosure provision as an option. For example: "I don't see what's
wrong with walking away .. . . You have a contract which specifies
what happens if you break the contract, so in effect that's just another
[Y]ou're playing within the rules of the
option within the contract ....
9
game."
Clearly, readers disagreed about the moral implications of
walking away. Some saw it as a willful act of promise breaking, while
others thought that it was the exercise of an option explicitly
permitted by the deal itself.
Strategic default implicates powerful but competing norms.
Americans take their promissory obligations very seriously, even in

Stephen J. Dubner, Our Daily Bleg: A Real-Estate Dilemma, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2009,
6.
http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.con2009/02/09/our-daily-bleg-a-real-estatePM),
12:48
dilemma].
Paul Lightfoot, posting at id. (Feb. 12, 2009, 3:59 PM), http://www.freakonomics.com/
7.
2009/02/09/our-daily-bleg-a-real-estate-dilemmacomment-page-10#comments.
Al Shealy, posting at id. (Feb. 9, 2009, 1:20 PM), http://www.freakonomics.com/2009/02
8.
/09/our-daily-bleg-a-real-estate-dilemma#comments.
Julian, posting at id. (Feb. 9, 2009, 1:54 PM), http://www.freakonomics.com/2009/02/09/
9.
our-daily-bleg-a-real-estate-dilemma/comment-page-2#comments.
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the face of clear and conflicting economic incentives.1 0 Most people
think that it is wrong to break a promise, and most people think that
breach of contract is a form of promise breaking.1 1 However, mortgage
contracts are akin to contracts with liquidated damages clauses in
that they specify the penalty for breach, and this may reduce the
moral constraints on default.12 Although there are some penalties for
default beyond the transfer of the house,1 3 many states do not permit
deficiency judgments, 14 and a poor credit score can be a price worth
paying. Depending on the context, a borrower may think of the
obligation to pay the mortgage as a moral commitment and see the
foreclosure as a painful penalty to pay for a serious legal and moral
violation. Or, she may think of the foreclosure as an option in the
contract-not a punishment, just an agreed-upon consequence of
default on loan payments. I present three empirical studies below to
specify the social and contextual triggers that reframe foreclosure as a
contract option rather than a moral violation.
My argument proceeds as follows: traditionally, an informal
norm weighed in favor of honoring the mortgage contract, and that
norm was bolstered by the harsh penalty of foreclosure. Today,
though, foreclosure is an increasingly weak penalty. When
homeowners are deeply underwater, and the home is the only asset at
risk when they default, it is much cheaper to pay the penalty-hand
over the home and take the credit hit-than it is to pay the mortgage.
Behavioral research suggests that when a contract includes a clause
that specifies the penalty for breach, people are more willing to
breach; they see breach as something like the exercise of an option
rather than the repudiation of a deal. However, the analogy of the
foreclosure "option" in the contract to a liquidated damages clause is
imperfect because when a borrower defaults, the lender goes
uncompensated. When there is real harm at stake, it may be more

10.

Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in

Breach of Contract, 6 J. EMPIRIcAL LEG. STUD. 405, 405 (2009).

11. Id. at 415.
12. Ernst Fehr & Bettina Rockenbach, Detrimental Effects of Sanctions on Human
Altruism, 422 NATURE 137, 138 (2003) (reporting that players in an experimental game were less
likely to reciprocate altruistic behavior when a partner could use sanctions to punish
noncooperative behavior).
13.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.4 (1997).

14. See Grant Nelson, Confronting the Mortgage Meltdown: A Brief for the Federalizationof
State Mortgage Foreclosure Law, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 583, 587-94 (2010) (detailing the different
approaches that states take to the personal liability of debtors for remaining debt after
foreclosure sale).
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difficult for individuals to rationalize the move from mortgage-aspromise to default-as-option.
So what tips people from the former conception to the latter? I
argue that the modern American mortgage system has moved away
from a conception of the lender-borrower relationship as a local,
personal commitment. This has been a huge shift, and it encompasses
a number of discrete changes. First, borrowers who believe that
lenders have been reckless and greedy are more likely to endorse
strategic default. Second, loans used to be local and personal; the
originating bank held and serviced a mortgage for the entire loan
period. Default is perceived as less immoral when the original
promisee is no longer a party to the contract. Finally, foreclosure itself
used to be shameful and stigmatizing, but, with more and more visible
foreclosures in an area, people consider default to be less immoral and
more acceptable. In this Article, I measure the moral beliefs about
these discrete changes.
In Part I, I lay the foundation for the subsequent arguments
and empirical evidence by reviewing the state of the modern
mortgage, including the relevant state law approaches to foreclosure.
This foundation is a crucial piece of the argument because I describe
the legal regime and the economic context in which foreclosure is,
unusually, a weak penalty. In Part II, I argue that the strategic
default decision is helpfully analogized to other breaches of contract. I
draw parallels between strategic default and the theory of efficient
breach. This Part concludes with a discussion of the psychology of
contract and, in particular, research on common moral intuitions
about breach of contract. Parts III, IV, and V offer empirical evidence
in support of my claims. In Part III, I argue that reciprocity and a
sense of fair play are significant considerations for would-be
defaulters, even in the face of clear financial incentives, and I present
an experiment on the role of fairness in housing decisions. In Part IV,
I hypothesize that the transfer of the mortgage from one lender
weakens the moral obligation to repay. I show results from an
experiment suggesting that the moral norm against default is weaker
for a transferred loan. In Part V, I present data from a scenario study
indicating that an increase in the number and salience of home
foreclosures erodes the commitment to mortgage repayment as a
moral duty. Finally, in Part VI, I discuss some of the implications of
this argument for mortgage policy, particularly loan modification and
securitization.
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I. FORECLOSURE IS A WEAK SANCTION

At first blush, it surely seems implausible to argue that
foreclosure is a weak sanction or a small penalty. In fact, though, in
the lexicon of behavioral economists, the penalty of foreclosure is
indeed small for the homeowners most deeply underwater. By this I do
not mean that foreclosure is not painful or expensive; I only mean that
it is ultimately cheaper to pay the penalty (to foreclose and accept the
consequences) than it is to pay the mortgage. In this Part, I begin by
describing the psychology of small penalties and arguing that weak
sanctions have behavioral consequences we should care about in the
mortgage context. I then turn to a more careful exposition of the
reasons that one can plausibly construe foreclosure as a weak rather
than a strong penalty for a class of underwater homeowners.
A. Cognitive and Behavioral Consequences of the Weak Sanction
In a number of experiments on interpersonal exchange,
researchers have found evidence that people are less likely to perform
if the penalty for breach is specified. 15 This literature, sometimes
called the "weak sanctions" literature, shows that when a small
penalty is too low to deter bad behavior, it is often nonetheless salient
enough to cause a shift away from a social norm. 16 In the classic study
of Israeli day cares, Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini found that
parents were less likely to pick up their children on time from day
care when the day care imposed a four-dollar late fine. 17 With no
penalty, tardiness is discourteous, even a sign of disrespect. When the
penalty is introduced, however, late pick-up simply becomes an option
in the contract.
The effect of small sanctions has also been studied in
experimental economics games; when researchers introduce a penalty
for selfishness into a game characterized by high levels of voluntary

15. See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological
Experiment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 633, 659 (2010) (reporting the results of an experiment in which
participants indicated greater willingness to breach a contract that included a liquidated
damages clause than one that did not); see also Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price,
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 7 (2000) (showing graphical evidence of the uptick over a course of twenty
weeks in late-coming parents in the group of parents asked to pay a fine).
16. Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 15, at 651-54 (reviewing literature on small sanctions
experiments).
17. See Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 15, at 7.
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reciprocity, players become more rather than less selfish.18 In a Trust
Game, for example, the first mover, the Investor, allocates some
amount of money to the second player, the Trustee. Whatever money
is passed is tripled. The Trustee then has the choice to pass some of
his earnings back to the Investor. When there are no constraints on
the Trustee's behavior, he often passes back between one-third and
one-half of his total. When the Trustee is subject to a small penalty for
small returns, he is more likely to return nothing and pay the penalty.
This shift in decisionmaking has even been shown at the level
of neural activity. Researchers conducted a Trust Game 19 in which
nontrustworthy behavior was subject to punishment by the
experimenter. Players made their decisions in an fMRI machine. 20 The
results suggested that nonsanctioned players were processing the
decision in areas of the brain associated with social rewards. Trustees
in the penalty game, on the other hand, looked as though they were
solving a math problem-their greatest activation was in the parietal
cortex, an area of the brain associated with rational, self-interested
2
decisionmaking. 1
In general, these kinds of studies suggest that a formal rule
against selfishness may have the effect of displacing the informal
norm that previously regulated the behavior. 22 In the mortgage
context, the formal rule is that defaulting homeowners in many states
can enter foreclosure proceedings and walk away from their mortgage
debt, though the longstanding informal norm weighs in favor of
honoring the mortgage commitment and paying down the debt. When
foreclosure is very costly, both the informal and the formal rule push
in the same direction. When foreclosure is comparably inexpensive,
though, the norm invokes moral commitments that the rule elides. In
18. Daniel Houser, Erte Xiao, Kevin McCabe & Vernon Smith, When Punishment Fails:
Research on Sanctions, Intentions, and Non-Cooperation, 62 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 509 (2008).
19. The Trust Game was developed by Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut, and Kevin McCabe,
Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History, 10 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 122, 124 (1995). The game
involves two players, an Investor and a Trustee. The Investor begins with ten dollars. She has
the choice to pass none, some, or all of her endowment to the Trustee. Whatever is passed is
tripled. The Trustee then has the choice to pass none, some, or all of her resulting wealth back to
the Investor.
20. Jian Li, Erte Xiao, Daniel Houser & P. Read Montague, Neural Responses to Sanction
Threats in Two-Party Economic Exchange, 106 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 16,835 (2009). A Trust
Game with sanctions is a game in which the Trustee pays a small penalty if she returns less
than the Investor requests.
21. Id. at 16,837.
22. See generally Bruno Frey & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, The Cost of Price Incentives: An
Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 746 (analyzing the
motivational effects of price incentives on prosocial behavior).
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the next Section, I describe the economic and legal context in which
foreclosure is such a weak sanction.
B. The Mortgage Crisis: Upside-Down Loans
The movement from traditional mortgages to mortgages with
nontraditional financing has changed the penalties associated with
foreclosure so that foreclosure is now a weak sanction. When a home
goes into foreclosure, the borrower faces three threats to her material
well-being. The first is that she loses her house. The second is that she
loses her other assets and even future wages if the lender succeeds in
obtaining a deficiency judgment. The third is that she takes a big hit
to her credit rating. These are serious negative consequences to
foreclosure, but these consequences may be much smaller than the
overall financial impact of paying down a big loan for a house worth
much less. Sometimes the rational decision for underwater
homeowners is default.
Traditionally, the biggest negative consequence associated with
foreclosure is losing one's home, which is typically a real harm.
Nonetheless, the impact of displacement may be smaller for buyers
who are relative newcomers to their neighborhoods or who did not
have plans to remain in their homes for very long. In addition, for
many recent homeowners, foreclosure does not necessarily mean
homelessness or even a big step down on the housing ladder.
Homeowners paying down a mortgage that originated in 2006 may
realize that they can rent a substantially similar property for a
fraction of their mortgage payment. This phenomenon is somewhat
unusual, historically, and it is the combined result of both a shift in
lending practices in the last fifty years and a bursting housing bubble.
In this Section, I offer a brief review of the recent history of American
homeownership to help explain the economic trajectory that has made
default more profitable than homeownership for so many borrowers.
Overall, the first decade of the twenty-first century saw a spike
in high-risk loans, a spike in home sales, and then a nearly
unprecedented fall in home prices, leaving more homeowners more
deeply underwater than at any time in recent history. More than twothirds of American adults own a home. Homeownership has
traditionally been understood as a stabilizing force in American
society. 23 This is partly symbolic in that homeownership is one way of

23. See P. MICHAEL COLLINS, PURSUING THE AMERICAN DREAM: HOMEOWNERSHIP AND THE
ROLE OF FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY 5 (2002).
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expressing one's investment, as a citizen, in the community and the
country. 24 Homeownership also has practical effects on stability. As
Adam Levitin and Susan Wachter have pointed out, owning a home is25
a hedge against the increasing costs of living faced by renters.
Owners move less frequently than renters. Paying down a mortgage
over many years is a kind of savings plan, particularly for older
people, making it easier for homeowners to absorb income shocks like
retirement. This is a fairly conservative model of homeownership, and
it was reflected in lending practices. Until 2005, lenders financed only
a small minority of loans-fewer than ten percent-using
nontraditional mortgages. 26 Homeownership was reserved for buyers
with substantial savings for a large down payment, stable
employment to make monthly payments, and a long-term plan to
reside in the home.
In the last fifteen years, this picture has begun to change.
During the early 1990s, fewer than eight million new loans were
originated each year. 2 7 In 2000, that number began to climb, reaching
a peak of over twenty million mortgages originated in 2003.28 As the
number of mortgages rose, so did the fraction of those mortgages with
include
mortgages
Nontraditional
financing.
nontraditional
adjustable-rate mortgages, jumbo loans, interest-only loans, and
balloon loans. Interest-only loans, for example, accounted for only two
percent of mortgages in 2004 but rose to twenty percent in 2007.29 In
general, these kinds of loan structures permit new homeowners to
purchase a home with less capital and lower initial payments. In turn,
these borrowers have less equity in the home during the first stage of
the loan. 30 Furthermore, many loans at the beginning of the new

24. See, e.g., D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255,
255 (2005) ("As our cultural clich6 'a house is not a home' suggests, 'home' means far more than a
physical structure. 'Home' evokes thoughts of, among many other things, family, safety, privacy,
and community. In the United States, home and home ownership are held in high cultural
esteem, as American as apple pie and baseball.").
25. Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Information Failure and the U.S. Mortgage
Crisis (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Bus. Econ. & Regulatory Policy Working Paper Series,
Research Paper No. 1,605,275, Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Research
Paper No. 1,605,275, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstractl1605275.
26. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT: SECURITIZATION AND THE
MORTGAGE CRISIS 10 (2010).

27. PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT: THE MORTGAGE CRISIS, supra note 3, at 4.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. And, in fact, some of these loans were not fully amortizing, so that even at the end of the
loan period, borrowers would need to make a large "balloon" payment to pay off the mortgagor.
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century were refinances, and one report estimates that in 2003, for
31
example, one in three American homes were refinanced.
On the homeowner side, then, people were buying more and
refinancing more, with less equity and bigger interest payments, and
this precipitated the recent financial crisis. 32 In 2008, the housing
market crashed, pushing home values in some areas below half of
their purchase price. 33 In 2009, one in twenty homeowners were in
default. 34 In the "sand states"-California, Arizona, Florida, and
Nevada-fifteen percent of homes were in serious delinquency. 35 Thus,
for the first time since the Texas oil recession of the 1980s, foreclosure
became a legitimately attractive option for millions of Americans.
C. Real Estate Law: The End of Deficiency Judgments
Even if a home were worth much less than the outstanding
mortgage, default would nonetheless remain unattractive as long as
the lender could and would penalize the homeowner by pursuing the
borrower's remaining assets and wages. In fact, the prospect of losing
assets other than the house in the foreclosure process is increasingly
unlikely for two reasons. First, many of the states that have been
hardest hit by the housing crisis are states with nonrecourse laws,
meaning that the lenders are not permitted to seek a deficiency
judgment against debtors who have gone through the foreclosure
proceeding. 36 Second, even in cases in which banks are legally
empowered to go after delinquent homeowners, that pursuit is often
impractical, in part because the banks lack resources to deal with a
37
high volume of foreclosure actions.
When a homeowner stops making mortgage payments, the
subsequent consequences of default are partly determined by the laws
of the state in which the home is located. For example, imagine a

31.

PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT: THE MORTGAGE CRISIS, supra note 3, at 4.

32.

See BARRY BOSWORTH & AARON FLAAEN, AMERICA'S FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE END OF AN

ERA 3 (2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/0414_financialcrisis_
bosworth.aspx (describing the origins of the financial crisis).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., John Mixon, Fannie Mae/FreddieMac Home Mortgage Documents Interpreted
as Nonrecourse Debt (with Poetic Comments Lifted from Carl Sandburg), 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 35,
37 (2008) (noting that it is often not worth the hassle to the lender to pursue a deficiency
judgment and that some states have a statutory redemption policy onerous enough that lenders
prefer "speedy liquidation" and waive their rights to deficiency).
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homeowner who owes $200,000 on her home, which is then sold at
auction for $125,000. Her obligations to the lender at that point
depend on the state and on the lender. The Restatement (Third) of
Property (Mortgages) takes the traditional position that a lender who
is still owed money even after a foreclosure sale can go after the
borrower for the remainder of the debt by obtaining a deficiency
judgment.3 8 In many states, however, the borrower owes the bank
nothing. California is a nonrecourse state, for example. 39 Some states,
like Pennsylvania and New York, have adopted a middle-ground
solution where deficiency judgments are permitted, but borrowers owe
only the difference between the outstanding loan and the fair market
value of the house, usually a smaller amount than the actual
difference between sale price and debt. 40 Finally, many states permit
lenders to pursue a judgment for the full value of the difference
between the loan amount and the sale price, including the power to
41
garnish a borrower's wages and seize her assets.
Even where full recovery is allowed, the fate of a borrower in
default also depends on the lender and the lender's interest in and
ability to pursue a deficiency action. In many cases, lenders do not
pursue a deficiency judgment because the homeowners have no assets
and no income-that's why they are in foreclosure in the first place.
However, in other cases, the sheer volume of foreclosure actions is
overwhelming, and lenders lack the resources to go after delinquent
42
borrowers.
The lender's practical ability to sue for a deficiency judgment is
partially dependent on the state's foreclosure procedure. Although
some states permit "power of sale" foreclosure, many require the
lender to file in court, which is time-consuming and costly:
A typical judicial foreclosure entails a long series of steps: filing of a foreclosure
complaint and lis
pendens notice; service of process on all parties whose interests may be
prejudiced by the proceeding; a hearing, frequently by a master in chancery who then
reports to the court; the decree or judgment; the notice of sale; a public foreclosure sale,

38.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.4 (1997) ("If the foreclosure sale price

is less than the unpaid balance of the mortgage obligation, an action may be brought to recover a
deficiency judgment against any person who is personally liable on the mortgage obligation in
accordance with the provisions of this section.").
39. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(b) (West 1980) ('No deficiency judgment shall lie in any
event after a sale of real property or an estate for years therein for failure of the purchaser to
complete his or her contract of sale."). The nondeficiency statute does not apply to home equity
loans or refinances.
40. See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1371 (McKinney 2009); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
8103(c) (West 2009).
41. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 702.06 (West 1996).
42. See Mixon, supra note 37, at 37.
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usually conducted by a sheriff; post-sale adjudication as to the disposition
of the
43
foreclosure proceeds; and, if appropriate, the entry of a deficiency judgment.

When states like Florida have a flood of new foreclosure actions
and a slow, inefficient system for processing them, the cost of seeking
deficiency judgments deters banks from going after defaulters. Thus,
for one or more of an array of reasons, the house is often a
homeowner's only asset at risk in default.
D. Credit Scores: New Tools for PricingLow Credit
Anyone who defaults on a home will see a big drop in her credit
score. Most people are powerfully motivated by fear of the
consequences of a poor credit score. 44 However, as scary as it is to be
denied access to credit, the consequences of poor credit are not infinite,
and they can be priced with only a bit of research. Companies like
YouWalkAway.com, a web-based service that helps homeowners
navigate the foreclosure process, guide defaulters on how to minimize
the hit to credit and how to compare the cost of seven years of low
credit to the cost of making big payments on a house worth very
45
little.
Most people overestimate the effect of bad credit or at least are
uncertain enough about the consequences to fear the worst.
Foreclosure causes a credit score drop of about 85 to 160 points. 46 For
people with average credit, this means a drop into the 500s, a zone in
which it is very difficult to open new lines of credit. Foreclosure
counseling services like YouWalkAway.com advise clients to think
through their next housing step before they lose their homes, even
securing a rental property before defaulting so that the credit check
happens before the hit. Similarly, families that anticipate needing a
new car might purchase one before foreclosure. The effect of sites like
YouWalkAway.com is to bring some certainty to the calculation. Even

43. Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform Nonjudicial
ForeclosureAct, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1403 (2004).
44. See Brent T. White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear and the Social
Management of the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971, 984-85 (2010) (describing how
homeowners think about credit scores).
45. YOUWALKAWAY.CoM, http://www.youwalkaway.com (last visited Feb. 4, 2011). Other
sites with similar "foreclosure calculators" include PAY OR Go, http://www.payorgo.com (last
visited Feb. 4, 2011) and STRATEGIC MORTGAGE DEFAULT SYSTEM, http://www.strategicloan
default.com (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
46. See, e.g., Les Christie, How ForeclosureAffects Your Credit Score, CNNMONEY (Apr. 22,
2010, 4:44 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/04/22/reaLestate/foreclosurecreditscore/index.htm.
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if the cost of poor credit is not dropping, 47 tools like
YouWalkAway.com permit underwater borrowers to put a price on
reputation cost and move on with their cost-benefit calculation.
In sum, foreclosure is a weak sanction at this particular
economic moment. The convergence of the recent high volume of
expensive, nontraditional loans and a burst housing bubble mean that
paying mortgage debt is unusually expensive. Legal and practical
barriers to banks seeking deficiency judgments and the increasing
ability of homeowners to accurately price the cost of a temporarily low
credit score make foreclosure unusually cheap. Given these
circumstances, it should not be surprising to find underwater
homeowners appraising the strategic default decision with the same
attention to the formal rule (you can walk away if you pay the penalty)
that psychologists and economists have observed in other weak
sanctions contexts.
II. ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY OF DEFAULT

Strategic default in the mortgage context is partially analogous
to a more familiar legal analysis: willful breach of contract. Mortgages
are contracts, and we can draw on contracts research from other
domains to inform an analysis of contract decisionmaking in this
context. I briefly lay out the economic analysis of breach of a mortgage
contract and then describe the behavioral research that has
challenged the economic view.
A. Strategic Default and Breach of Contract
A borrower's obligation to repay a mortgage loan is embodied in
a standard form contract. 48 The terms of the borrower's performance
typically specify the interest on the loan, the date of each monthly
payment, and the lender's recourse in the case of nonpayment. 49
Borrowers who breach their loan contracts are in default. For the
homeowner, default is a profitable breach of the mortgage contract
when it is cheaper overall to walk away from a house and loan than it
47. In fact, the cost of poor credit may indeed be dropping as the average credit score

declines.
48. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 15 (2008) ("Wortgage
contracts are standard form contracts.").
49.

See, e.g., Sample Forms: Mortgage, LUXURY HOMES & PROPS. http://www.luxuryhomes

andproperties.com/_publicLfiles/forms/assign-mortgage.htm
(last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
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is for the homeowner to remain in the home and keep making
payments. For example, imagine the simplified case of a homeowner
with an interest-only loan who owes $250,000 on a home worth
$100,000. She is paying $1,500 each month, but she could live in a
similar place for about half of that cost. Even after a sharp hit to her
credit, she saves money by defaulting on her original mortgage.5 0 For
many borrowers, even taking into account the stress of defaulting and
moving, the strategic, self-interested choice is default.
B. Psychology of Promise and Contract
An economic analysis of contracts predicts that parties will
breach a contract when breaching is overall more profitable than
performance. This analysis neglects the very real effects of moral
norms on contract behavior. Most people take their contractual
obligations seriously and assume that breaking a contract is akin to
breaking a promise.5 1 Stewart Macaulay's seminal study of business
contracts in 1963 revealed a surprising reliance on the informal norm
against "welshing" rather than the legal rules of contract.5 2 Zev Eigen
has demonstrated that people will perform onerous tasks if they
believe that those tasks are specified in a contract that they knowingly
signed, even when it becomes clear that performance is not
worthwhile.5 3 In earlier research, I found that people think that
expectation damages are an inadequate remedy to breach, that breach
is morally problematic even if the breacher pays full damages, and
that most people think that the moral context of breach ought to
matter.5 4 A promisor who breaks a contract to avoid taking a big loss
is treated more sympathetically than one whose motives seem
greedy.5 5 Mortgage contracts are contracts too, and anecdotal evidence
like the blog comments cited in the Introduction suggests that people

50. As I observed above, walking away from an underwater home is not Pareto-superior to
repayment. As long as the lender is unable to recover the difference between the original loan
and the sale price, default makes the borrower better off but the lender worse off.
51. See Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 10, at 405.
52. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55, 60
(1963); id. at 58 ("Businessmen often prefer to rely on 'a man's word' in a brief letter, a
handshake, or 'common honesty and decency'-even when the transaction involves exposure to
serious risks.").
53. Zev Eigen, When and Why Individuals Obey Form-Adhesive Contracts: Experimental
Evidence of Consent, Compliance, Promise and Performance 27 (July 14, 2010) (unpublished
paper), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1640245.
54. See Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 10, at 405.
55. Id. at 414.
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believe that they ought to live up to a promise to repay. As in other
contracts contexts, people are sensitive to the moral context of default,
not just the financial equation.
Indeed, all else being equal, most people prefer to honor their
promissory obligations. However, when a contract specifies damages,
people are more willing to breach and pay damages when it is
profitable to do so-that is, when breach is efficient, the liquidated
damages clause causes a weak sanction effect. 56 In a 2010 paper, I
offered experimental evidence that breach is less morally objectionable
57
when the contract in question includes a liquidated damages clause.
Breach becomes part of the agreement rather than a repudiation of
the meeting of the minds. In a series of questionnaire studies, I
showed participants examples of contract scenarios and asked them to
put themselves in the position of the promisor. I then asked them to
give me the lowest dollar amount that they would be willing to accept
to breach their contract and take a better offer. When they read a
contract that included a liquidated damages clause, they were willing
to take significantly less than they would accept in cases in which the
contract omitted mention of breach.
Although this Article's argument relies on an analogy between
default and breach, real estate contracts are admittedly quite different
from other kinds of contracts; in fact, real estate law is a category of
property rather than contract law. 58 If a foreclosure were in fact a
liquidated damages clause, then the stipulated remedy would be
exclusive; it is not. Many states, and the Restatement approach,
permit lenders to seize assets, garnish wages, and otherwise pursue
defaulters until the defaulters repay their entire debt. 59 Furthermore,
strategic defaults are not efficient breaches because they leave at least
one party, the lender, worse off.60 When a borrower decides to default
on a home loan, the lender does not recover the full value of the loan.
This can be because the borrower simply has no more money, because
state law does not permit recourse, or because the debtor files for
bankruptcy; the result is that the debt is disgorged. This means real

56. Id.
57. Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 15.
58. For example, mortgage contracts are part of the Property Restatement. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 1 (1997) (covering the creation of mortgage

contracts).
59. Supra Part I.C.
60. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON.
466, 467 (1980) (discussing the importance of Pareto efficiency in the analysis of contractual
damages).
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harm to the lender. For this reason, foreclosure is arguably a more
serious moral violation than breaching a contract and paying
damages, in the sense that it involves harm to another party. It is not
as bad as theft, perhaps, but a defaulter would be hard pressed to
argue that walking away puts the bank in the same position it would
have been in had the defaulter continued to make payments.
In a world in which foreclosure is actually cheaper than staying
put, the question is whether or not people still view foreclosure as a
moral issue, invoking all the self-recrimination and social stigma that
come with serious moral violations. The rest of this Article takes up
that question-what kinds of factors affect the moral calculus of
61
strategic default?
III. RECIPROCITY AND FAIRNESS
A. Retaliation
In the context of behavioral economics, reciprocity means that
people respond to friendliness with cooperation, even costly
62
cooperation, and hostility with retaliation, even costly retaliation.
Reciprocity norms are particularly important in contract-a fact that
scholars have noted at least since the early 1960s. 63 In the mortgage
context, reciprocity matters too. As one commenter from the New York
Times blog said, "Don't think for a moment that a bank won't take the
opportunity to screw [the homeowner], no matter how 'unethical' or
'fair' the situation. Why should banks get to follow by the 'it's just
64
business' rule and [the homeowner] can't?"

61. I take up this question keeping in mind that reasoning about financial decision-making
is motivated reasoning. Psychology professor Thomas Gilovich describes motivated weighing of
evidence as a series of questions in which evidence that leads to a costly conclusion is evaluated
with the question, "Do I have to believe this?" and evidence that weighs in one's own interest is
evaluated by a standard of "Can I believe this?" For homeowners whose loans are deeply
underwater, there is a real motivation to think of why it might be morally permissible to treat
the foreclosure as a liquidated damages clause. This paper asks how they navigate the decision,
what kind of information they seek and use, what kinds of structural factors affect their
judgment, and how they hold themselves accountable for the choices they make. THOMAS
GILOVICH, How WE KNOW WHAT ISN'T So: THE FALLIBILITY OF HUMAN REASON IN EVERYDAY

LIFE (1991).
62. See generally ERNST FEHR & KARL SCHMIDT, THEORIES OF FAIRNESS AND RECIPROCITY:
EVIDENCE AND ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS (2001).

63. Macaulay, supranote 52, at 60.
64. Kent, posting at Our Daily Bleg." A Real-Estate Dilemma, supra note 6 (Feb. 9, 2009,
2:16
PM),
http://www.freakonomics.com/2O09/O2/09/our-daily-bleg-a-real-estate-dilemma/
comment-page-2/#comments.
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Other commenters raised an issue related to reciprocity;
namely, the relative moral standing of the lenders:
All of the bankslbusinesses that are having problems due to investments in real estate
had a responsibility to their customers and shareholders to conduct business by making
loans to people only after performing due diligence and reasonable business practices.
but the well-meaning, prudent
These banks are being bailed out with no accountability,
65
borrower is brow beaten into following the rules.

Or, succinctly: "Unethical? It's nothing Wall Street hasn't been
'66
the last few years.
for
doing
In the case of mortgage default, the important norms at stake
are essentially fairness norms. From the point of view of the
homeowners, the questions are equitable concerns, such as whether it
is fair to make a promise and break it, whether it is fair to impose
negative externalities on other borrowers by foreclosing, and whether
the lender is treating the borrower justly. The basic findings of
fairness research suggest that most people reward generosity and
punish selfishness, even when those responses are costly. 67 We might
take an Ultimatum Game as the paradigmatic example. In an
Ultimatum Game, two players, a Proposer and a Responder, are
paired. The Proposer is allocated ten dollars and is given the
opportunity to offer none, some, or all of the money to the Responder.
The Responder can accept the offer, in which case the money is
distributed as the Proposer suggested, or the Responder can reject the
offer, in which case both parties get nothing. In general, Responders
68
reject stingy offers even though rejection means a zero payoff. Most
people in the responding role reject any offer less than three or four
dollars-they prefer to get nothing and stick it to the Proposer than to
take home two dollars and let the Proposer keep eight dollars.
Similarly, in a classic Trust Game, most players repay generosity even
69
though they do not have to do so.
The nature of the reciprocity concern in the mortgage lending
debate is fairly straightforward: in the popular press and elsewhere,

65. joe [sic], posting at id. (Feb. 9, 2009, 2:28 PM), http://www.freakonomics.com/2009/02/09
/our-daily-bleg-a-real-estate-dilemmacomment-page-3/#comments.
66. mannyv [sic], posting at id. (Feb. 10, 2009, 12:25 AM), http://www.freakonomics.com/
2009/02/09/our-daily-bleg-a-real-estate-dilemmacomment-page-8/#comments.
67. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity,
14 J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 159-60 (2000).
68. Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairnessand the Assumptions of
Economics, 59 J. Bus. S285, S290 (1986).
69. Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe, supranote 19, at 124.
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banks have been portrayed as greedy and predatory.70 To the extent
that people think that banks are bad actors generally, they will feel
less inclined to cooperate. 71 When homeowners are facing the decision
to default on a loan that they are able to make payments on,
cooperation is costly. Most people do not altruistically transfer
resources to immoral counterparties. 72 Particularly when lenders have
sold subprime mortgages, they appear to have behaved irresponsibly.
In public goods games, cooperative players and third-party observers
are willing to pay money to punish free riders. 73 When banks have
been bailed out, homeowners may perceive a kind of governmentsanctioned free-riding on taxpayers.
In turn, homeowners may begin to feel spiteful toward banks
that do not seem to be acting reasonably or dealing in good faith.
Banks seem to have been acting with impunity for the last ten years,
aggressively pursuing high-risk loans and then benefiting from
government bailout efforts when their bets turned out to be losers.
Homeowners took the advice of lenders, accepted the bets, and then,
when the economy soured, received no government relief. In the
meantime, many banks have resisted any write-downs of principaland, in fact, banks are often unable to reduce principal because of
contracts with investors, an issue that I will take up in more detail in
a later section of this paper.7 4 From the borrower's point of view, this
looks very odd. Take a borrower whose home has lost half its value.
The homeowner does the math and sees that it is clearly in her best
interest to walk away. Rather than walk away, she calls the bank and
asks for a modification of her loan-which is to say, she offers in some
sense to share the deficit. The bank says no, it will not or cannot do
anything to change her loan. From the homeowner's perspective, this
exchange suggests that the bank would rather absorb the entire deficit
and impose extra costs on the homeowner (credit, etc.) than negotiate
70. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
26, 2007, at BI ("Countrywide's entire operation, from its computer system to its incentive pay
structure and financing arrangements, is intended to wring maximum profits out of the
mortgage lending boom no matter what it costs borrowers, according to interviews . . . and
internal documents.").
71. See, e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 68, at S291 (showing experimental
results indicating that people prefer to give money to a fair player than a stingy player, even if it
is costly).
72. Id.
73. See Fehr & Gachter, supranote 67, at 160.
74. See, e.g., David Streitfeld, Banks Resist Plans to Reduce Mortgage Balances, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 13, 2010, at B1 (citing an official from Chase who responded to government pressure to
modify loans by pointing out that "Chase cannot rewrite most of these deals. The bank's
contractual arrangements with investors do not allow for principal reduction.").
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a new arrangement. It should not be particularly surprising that
homeowners would find this unreasonable. In the study below, I test
the hypothesis that the perceived fairness of a lender's own behavior
affects how borrowers conceive of their own moral obligations under
the mortgage contract.
B. Study 1: Lender Morality and Default
The studies in this Article use substantially similar
methodologies, so I will go into some detail in describing the method of
Study 1, and will then refer back to it in shorter form in the
descriptions of Studies 2 and 3. The first set of studies tests the role of
reciprocity norms in strategic default decisions using a hypothetical
decision paradigm.
In each of the experiments reported here, online survey-takers
were presented with a series of hypothetical default situations and
were asked to report on their perception of and likely response to each
scenario. 75 Each hypothesis was tested by presenting subjects with one
of two nearly identical scenarios, scenarios in which only the variable
of interest differed. For example, in the first reported study, I showed
subjects a strategic default scenario in either a Bailout or a No Bailout
condition, testing whether or not subjects were more hostile toward a
bank that had accepted government bailout funds.
I tested subjects' differential responses to the experimental
manipulations in two ways. First, I was interested in subjects' explicit
views on the differences between the conditions. As such, I measured
the within-subjects differences across the conditions. For example, did
a given subject's willingness to default change in response to the new
fact about the lender's behavior? Within-subjects analyses like this
depend on the transparency of the experiment to the subject. Because
each subject saw every scenario in both conditions, they could see
precisely the variables being tested. Second, I was also interested in

75. Subjects were members of a panel recruited over a ten-year period, mostly through their
own efforts at searching for ways to earn money by completing questionnaires. Approximately
ninety percent of respondents were U.S. residents (with the rest mostly from Canada). The panel
is roughly representative of the adult U.S. population in terms of income, age, and education but
not in terms of sex, because (for unknown reasons) women predominate in this respondent pool.
For each study, an email was sent to about five hundred members of the panel, saying how much
the study paid and where to find it on the World Wide Web. Each study was a series of separate
web pages, programmed in JavaScript. The first page provided brief instructions. Each of the
others presented a case, until the last, which asked for (optional) comments and sometimes
contained additional questions. Each case had a space for optional comments. Otherwise the
subject had to answer all questions to proceed.
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implicit attitudes or effects that would not necessarily show up in a
within-subjects analysis. To test between-subjects effects, subjects in
each study were randomly assigned to see one condition or the other
first. For between-subjects analyses, I compared the responses of those
subjects who saw one condition first to those who saw the other
condition first. Most of the results reported here are primarily
concerned with within-subjects differences, but some notable betweensubjects effects are also reported.
1. Method
In Study 1, I used subprime lending and the acceptance of
government bailout funds as examples of lender behavior that might
erode a homeowner's sense of reciprocal obligation. In each case, I also
specified that modification had been refused and asked subjects to
judge the reasonableness of the bank's actions.
Each scenario presents a situation that could conceivably be
understood as a case of a bank behaving irresponsibly or selfishly
without paying for it. Each participant saw each case in two versions:
Bailout or No Bailout, Subprime or Traditional. This study was
embedded into a larger questionnaire, so overall each participant read
and responded to fourteen different vignettes, four of which are being
reported here (Bailout, No Bailout, Subprime, Traditional). 76 Subjects
read each scenario and then answered follow-up questions. They were
asked to indicate the least percentage decrease in home value at
which they would be willing to default ("WTD"). The response mode
was presented as a choice of values; they could choose any decile
between zero and one-hundred percent. They then answered questions
about the morality of default and the reasonableness of the bank's
actions on a ten-point scale. 77 The scales went from "not at all" wrong
or unreasonable to "extremely" wrong or unreasonable. The hypothesis
in each case was that greedy behavior on the part of banks would
make people think that default was less immoral, that refusal to
modify was more unreasonable, and that default would be acceptable
at a higher home value. The first case is reprinted below.

76. The study is available at FINANCIAL DECISION-MAKING STUDY (PREC6), http://finzi.psych
.upenn.edul-baronexltess/prec6.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2011). The data file is publicly
available at http://finzi.psych.upenn.edu/-baron/R/tess/prec6.data.
77. The results for all experiments were analyzed with t-tests. I will report the t-value (t),
the degrees of freedom (dl), and the p-value (p)-the probability of finding such a result
randomly if no actual difference exists-for each significance test.
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Please imagine that you own a home in California. You bought your home in 2005 for
$500,000 on an interest-only, non-recourse loan. A non-recourse loan means that if you
stop making mortgage payments, the bank will take back your house, but it will not be
able to come after you for the balance of what you owe.
Bailout Condition:Your mortgage is with Gateway Funding, a company that has been in
the news because of its receipt of billions of dollars of government bailout money.
No Bailout Condition: Your mortgage is held by Gateway Funding, a national lender
that has not been involved with government bailout programs and has received no aid
from the federal government.
Both: The consequences of defaulting on your mortgage would be that the bank takes
your house, and you would have a lower credit score for the next 7 years. Right now you
owe the bank $500,000, but you know that your house is worth much, much less in the
current housing market. You are employed and just able to make your monthly
payments. Gateway will not modify your loan agreement.
You know that if you walked away from your house and voluntarily entered foreclosure
proceedings, you would save substantial amounts of money, even after accounting for
the credit score hit. Imagine that your house is worth 10% less than when you bought it.
Would you walk away? What about 50% less?
Please indicate below the first point at which you would prefer to default on your
mortgage contract rather than stay in your home.
To what extent do you think it is morally wrong to default on your mortgage contract in
this case?
To what extent do you think the bank's actions are reasonable in this situation?

The Subprime scenario used the same set of facts and response
questions as the Bailout scenario, but it also offered information about
the lender's risk profile rather than information about government
funds. As before, all subjects read that they had a $500,000 interestonly loan. The conditions differed only in whether subjects read the
following statements about the mortgage-holder's lending practices.
Subprime Condition: Your mortgage is with Gateway Funding. You have a sub-prime
mortgage, and Gateway has received considerable media attention for its aggressive,
high-risk lending practices in the last five years.
Traditional Condition: Your mortgage is
conservative, traditional mortgage company.

held by Gateway

Funding, a fairly

There were 153 subjects in Study 1. Respondents were paid
three dollars each for their participation. They ranged in age from
twenty to seventy-three, with a median age of forty-five. Thirty
percent of subjects were male.
2. Results
For each of the three variables (Wrong, Reasonable, and WTD),
I report mainly within-subjects results. I did extract between-subjects
data for each item by exploiting the varied order of presentation. To
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the extent that between-subjects results were significant or unusual, I
note them in the text or the footnotes.
Overall, a home losing half of its value was the crucial tipping
point. The median and mode response to the WTD question was 50%.
The experimental manipulations did have some effects on that focal
point, though. In the Bailout comparison, subjects reported that they
would require less financial incentive (a smaller loss in home value) to
walk away when the lending bank had received government bailout
money. 78 Specifically, 24.8% of subjects said that they would be willing
to default at a higher home value if the bank had been bailed out.
Participants in this experiment reported that defaulting was less
morally problematic 79 and that the bank's actions were significantly
80
less reasonable in the Bailout condition.
The Subprime manipulation yielded similar results; subjects
found default more attractive and less wrong when they read that the
lender had engaged in aggressive, risky lending practices. All three
variables differed significantly within-subjects in the predicted
direction, across conditions. Subjects were willing to default on a home
that had lost less of its value in the Subprime condition. Specifically,
24.1% of subjects reported that they would default sooner-with less
total loss-in the Subprime condition.8 1 They thought that default was
less morally problematic 82 and that the bank's actions were
significantly less reasonable in the Subprime condition.8 3 No
significant differences emerged in between-subjects comparisons,
though all trends were in the same direction.
Taken together, these results help illustrate the deep
connection between legal obligations like loan repayment and moral
norms implicated by those obligations. Subjects were more open to
default, practically and morally, when the bank had received extra
78. On average, subjects reported that they would be willing to default at a home value
about 3.5% higher in the Bailout condition (t=3.258, df=152, p=0.0014). Between-subjects results
were also marginally significant for this question (meaning that a given subject who saw only the
Bailout version gave a lower percentage loss required for default than a given subject who saw
only the No Bailout version). Mean Bailout: 42.3% value loss; Mean No Bailout: 50.4% value loss
(t=1.707, df=133.03, p=0.090).
79. Mean difference on ten-point scale: 0.359 (t=2.616, df=152, p=0.010). Between-subjects
results were also marginally significant in this case. On a ten-point scale, where 1 was "not
wrong at all" and 10 was "extremely wrong": Mean Bailout: 4.74; Mean No Bailout: 5.57 (t=1.835,
df=133.9, p=0.069).
80. Mean difference on ten-point scale: 0.53 (t=2.670, df=152, p=0.008). Between-subjects
results were in the same direction but not significant.
81. Mean difference: 3.9% (t=3.300, p=0.001 2 ).
82. Mean difference on a ten-point scale: 0.29 (t=2.091, df=152, p=0.038).
83. Mean difference on a ten-point scale: 0.35 (t=2.272, df=152, p=0.0244).
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money either via the bailout or via subprime lending. And, in both
cases, subjects thought that refusal to modify loans was significantly
less reasonable when the banks themselves had been treated
leniently. These are small overall differences, but they are robust.
Because I am reporting primarily within-subjects differences, the data
I show here also represent explicit, conscious beliefs on the part of
subjects. They can compare one kind of bank to another and report on
their differing moral obligations to each. The moral imperatives of
promise keeping or debt repayment diminish when citizens perceive
that banks are getting away with selfish behavior while ordinary
people are being held to their promises.
Of course, the lenders in this kind of case are not actually doing
anything contraindicated by the mortgage contract itself. The
borrowers' feelings about the lenders' behavior are not derived from a
notion that the lenders have legally breached the implied warranty of
good faith; rather, the borrowers read in some kind of general norms.
Psychology research has shown that people's expectations for
contracts are driven in part by their assumptions about the norms of
contract and promise. Psychologists Sandra Robinson and Denise
Rousseau have described a phenomenon in which employees often feel
that their employers have breached the employment contract when
the employer breaks implicit promises or fails to uphold obligations of
reciprocity.84 The result is less job satisfaction, intention to leave a job
sooner, and less trust overall. The important thing about this
phenomenon is that people have certain assumptions about
promissory relationships that extend beyond the agreement captured
in writing. This has been documented in the employment context, and
there are parallels to the mortgage context, where the sales promises
may differ in tone if not in content from the loan document itself.
The notion that trust affects cooperation is not foreign to legal
scholars. Dan Kahan has argued that there is a "logic of reciprocity" or
a coherent set of predictions about how people deal with collective
action problems.8 5 When individuals observe others behaving in
trustworthy ways, they reciprocate by themselves contributing to the
public good. In an atmosphere of distrust, however, they do not
contribute and, in turn, inspire others to defect as a means of
retaliation. Kahan has suggested that this model applies to the cycle
84. Sandra L. Robinson & Denise M. Rousseau, Violating the Psychological Contract: Not
the Exception but the Norm, 15 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 245, 245 (1994) (describing the role of
perceived breach of contract in the employment context).
85. Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 71, 103 (2003).
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of distrust between law enforcement officers and inner-city residents:
Authorities observe crime and raise penalties, citizens observe
excessive penalties and retaliate, authorities observe retaliation and
raise penalties, and on and on. We might compare this situation to the
case of mortgage lenders who refuse to modify loans on the grounds
that a nonmodification policy deters strategic homeowners from
seeking unjustified paydowns. Homeowners may see this as a signal of
distrust or suspicion, in turn encouraging them to retaliate or at least
reconceptualize the obligation in terms of a profit-motivated business
transaction. The straightforward point of reciprocity research is that
people care about fairness in their dealings with others, and this is
true whether the other is a friend or a bank.
IV. ASSIGNED CONTRACTS AND SOCIAL DISTANCE

Studies of reciprocity, generosity, and other-regarding
preferences have observed the commonsense phenomenon that
whether or not people care about equity or altruism varies as a
function of social distance. That is, I am more likely to care about
reciprocity when the counterparty is my sister than my colleague, and
more so my colleague than a passerby on the street. The concept of
social distance includes notions both of reciprocity 6 and of
identifiability. s7 Researchers using a Dictator Game have consistently
found that reciprocity varies inversely with social distance.8 8 A
Dictator Game is a simple two-player game in which one player, the
Dictator, is given ten dollars and the Receiver is given zero dollars.
The Dictator is just instructed to allocate the money. Once she makes
her choice, the money is distributed and the game is over. Behavioral
experimenters using a Dictator Game have found that Dictators share
more when Receivers are not anonymous (even when the Dictators are
anonymous to Receivers).8 9 Personal communication between the

86. Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe & Vernon Smith, Social Distance and OtherRegarding Behavior in Dictator Games, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 653, 653-54 (1996); see also Gary
Charness, Ernan Haruvy & Doron Sonsino, Social Distance and Reciprocity: The Internet vs. the
Laboratory (Nov. 2003) (unpublished), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=312141.
87. Iris Bohnet & Bruno S. Frey, Social Distance and Other-RegardingBehavior in Dictator
Games: Comment, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 335, 338-39 (1999) (arguing that the social distance effects
observed by Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith, supra note 86, are due to an effect akin to identifiable
victims).
88. Hoffman, McCabe & Smith, supra note 86, at 653-54.
89. Gary Charness & Uri Gneezy, What's in a Name? Anonymity and Social Distance in
Dictatorand Ultimatum Games, 68 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 29, 30 (2008).
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players in a game leads to increased intensity of other-regarding
preferences. 90
For the purposes of this Article, I operationalize social distance
in two contexts. The first is the more obvious point: people feel
differently about repaying Hometown Savings Bank than they do
about repaying International Corporate Bank. Older generations
describe the mortgage application in personal terms-they physically
went to the local bank to talk to a loan officer whom they either knew
or recognized as a local figure and then maintained a relationship
with that bank for years. Think of George Bailey in It's a Wonderful
Life explaining why he gave a loan to a local taxi driver: "I can
personally vouch for his character," he says, and later reminds his
customers that interpersonal trust is central to the business of local
lending in order to stop their run on his bank.
This movie anecdote is obviously an exaggeration of the local
model of lending that I describe, but the idea is that, in such a local
model, the notion of default would have been explicitly connected to
the harm it would cause to identifiable others. I do not ignore the
possibility that people form good relationships with Citibank or
JPMorgan Chase; I only propose that, overall, small local institutions
are more likely to tap into both reciprocity norms and identifiability
effects.
I also use the notion of social distance here in a sense that is
particular to the contracts domain. In a contract, two parties enter
into a binding agreement. Each party typically knows the identity of
the other, and the promise is normally party-specific. Certainly in the
world of ordinary promises, one person's pledge to another is personal
to the promisee. If I promise my friend that I will read a draft of her
paper, then she cannot transfer that promise to another aspiring
scholar and expect to hold me to my promise. When a contract is
assigned to a third party, the connection between promise and
contract is weakened. The social norms of promise keeping and
reciprocity are not so clearly applicable to a case in which the
promisor is not also the recipient of the performance.
In the mortgage context, the lending organization usually
changes over the course of the life of the loan. Most mortgage loans
change hands. Until the 1970s, mortgage lending was straightforward.
A borrower went to the bank, applied for a loan, and then the

90. Nancy R. Buchan, Eric J. Johnson & Rachel T.A. Croson, Let's Get Personal: An
International Examination of the Influence of Communication, Culture, and Social Distance on
OtherRegardingPreferences, 60 J. EcoN. BEHAV. & ORG. 373, 392 (2006).
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originating bank held the loan for the duration. By 1998, sixty-four
percent of mortgage loans were sold to large financial institutions. In
other words, mortgage lending changed from a model of "originate to
hold" to one of "originate and distribute." In the originate-to-hold
model, originators funded their loans from deposits, since most were
depository institutions-e.g., banks and credit unions. 91 In the
originate-and-distribute world, loans are funded by capital markets
via the securitization process. 92 Large financial institutions purchase
bundles of mortgages from originators, group them according to
characteristics like credit scores and loan-to-value ratios, and then sell
them as mortgage-backed securities. 93 The owner of a mortgagebacked security receives the right to the principal and interest
payment made by the borrower. 94 The owners of the mortgage-backed
securities enter into a contract to service the mortgages in the pool,
including handling negotiations with borrowers and dealing with
defaults, with the terms of any modifications subject in part to the
95
agreement between the originator and the holders of the securities.
It is also worthwhile to at least note that in the modern world
of banking, whether or not a bank holds a loan after origination,
customers usually deal with different bank employees before and after
origination. This is relevant to the psychology of the mortgage contract
because the mortgage broker or even the loan officer who handles the
mortgage application may develop a kind of intimate relationship with
the borrower. The borrower shares reams of highly personal, highly
sensitive information and often asks for and receives financial advice
(e.g., How much down payment? Should I lock in the rate now?).
Typically, this person is involved with the loan until settlement. Once

91. PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT: THE MORTGAGE CRISIS, supra note 3, at 3.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Anna Gelpern & Adam Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout
Prohibitionsin Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1081 (2009).
Gelpern and Levitin stated:
Residential mortgage securitization transactions are complex and varied, but their core
structure is simple. A financial institution (the "sponsor") owns a pool of mortgage loans,
which it either made itself ("originated") or bought. Rather than hold these mortgage
loans and the credit risk on its own books, it sells them to a shell entity, a special
purpose vehicle ("SPV") that is typically structured as a trust. The trust raises the funds
to pay for the loans by issuing securities, which are much like bonds whose payments
are secured by the loans in the trust.

Id.
94.
95.

Id. at 1083.
Id. at 1095.

20111

BREACHING THE MORTGAGE CONTRACT

1573

the loan is made, someone else does the servicing. 96 This means that
any subtleties of the negotiation, any real shared understanding or
meeting of the minds-using the terms "understanding" and "minds"
in the literal sense, referring to the parties' cognition-is rendered
useless or obsolete once the servicing of the loan is transferred to
another party in the bank. There is no shorthand, no sense for the
borrower that the person on the other end of the phone understands
her financial situation. Even in the original Macaulay studies, the
relevance of the promise to the contract was that the individual
parties had an essentially personal agreement that they would be
ashamed to break. This kind of psychological contract is not possible
when the individuals active in the promising are not also involved in
the performance monitoring.
Loan transfer may have practical consequences for the
borrower, but this Article is concerned primarily with the
psychological consequences. In the terms of a typical contract, the
original promisor sells the right to the promisee's performance to a
third party. My prediction is that assigned contracts are less likely to
be conceived of in terms of the promise and that the notion of promise
is what drives many people to keep making payments on mortgages
that are significantly underwater.
A. Study 2: Moral Obligationof a Transferred Loan
The prediction of the final study is that subjects will think that
default on a transferred or sold loan is less immoral, and therefore
more desirable, than default on a loan held by the originating bank. In
order to test the effects of assignment but to avoid confounding
assignment with identifiability, both the originating and the
purchasing lender are identified as large, remote institutions.
1. Method
This study was embedded in the same larger survey described
in the Method Section of Study 1. The scenario was identical to those
in Study 1, putting the subject in the place of a homeowner facing a
strategic default decision. In this case, the information being
manipulated was whether or not the loan had been sold after
origination:
96. See, e.g., Buying Your Home: Settlement Costs and Information, U.S. DEP'T Hous. &
URBAN DEV., http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/ramh/res/sfhrestc.cfm (last visited Feb. 7, 2011)
(describing the steps in the loan application process).
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Hold Condition: Your loan is held by Citigroup. You negotiated the terms of your loan
with a loan officer from Citigroup, and his office continues to service your mortgage.
Transfer Condition: Your loan originated at Citigroup. You negotiated the terms of your
mortgage with a loan officer from Citigroup. Your loan has since been sold to Wells
Fargo.

Again, as before, subjects saw the questions on their
willingness to default and the wrongfulness of default. There was no
question about the bank's reasonableness since these scenarios were
not meant to test the effect of different behavior, but rather different
parties.
2. Results
The 153 subjects who participated in Study 1 also participated
in this study. In both within- and between-subjects analyses, subjects
rated default on a transferred loan as significantly less immoral than
default on a loan still held by the originating lender. A given subject
rated default on a transferred loan as slightly less morally wrong than
default on a held loan. 97 The between-subjects results were somewhat
more dramatic. A subject who read only the Transfer question rated
the moral wrongness of default as 4.6 on a ten-point scale; subjects
who read only the Hold question rated the moral wrongness of default
98
at 5.8 on the scale.
Because loan transfer and securitization opened up new
avenues of mortgage funding, they resulted in greater liquidity for
banks and a lower cost of credit-in turn, more lending overall. 99 This
has had some positive effects, but it has almost certainly weakened
the relationship between contract and promise in the mortgage
context. The transfer and securitization of mortgages was part of a sea
change in mortgage lending, from simple tools to facilitate
homeownership to complex financial instruments for investors. This
change not only affects the nature of the mortgage obligation, but it
also has an effect on how ordinary borrowers think about the home
and the mortgage contract.

3
97. Within-subjects mean difference is 0.327 (t=3.052, df=152, p=0.01 ). Between subjects
0
mean difference is 1.238 (t=2.624, df=149.41, p= .010).
98. Neither the between- nor within-subjects analysis of the WTD difference yielded
significant results, though both showed differences in the predicted direction (e.g., an increased
willingness to default when the loan had been sold).
99. PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT: THE MORTGAGE CRISIS, supra note 3, at 20-21.
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V. SocIAL NORMS
As more people begin to walk away from their homes, or even
just do less to resist foreclosures, they may in turn affect a subsequent
generation of underwater homeowners simply by bringing about a
visibly increased foreclosure rate. When people see that their
neighborhood is filled with foreclosure signs, how are their perceptions
of community norms affected? And, in turn, how does the perception of
the social norm affect the moral norm-if I live in a society in which
most people think it is acceptable to default on a loan, how does that
affect my personal moral beliefs about default?
Social norms affect decisionmaking, even when people are
making ostensibly private decisions. One person in a room is much
more likely to litter if there is already paper on the floor. 10 0 Hikers in a
national forest are more likely to steal petrified wood if they see a sign
that says, "Many people have stolen petrified wood from this forest,
resulting in a drastically changed environment," than if they read a
"Do not steal petrified wood" sign. 10 1 It is not difficult to see a parallel
to the mortgage world. Lenders may believe that they are shaming
potential defaulters when they put up a foreclosure sign on the front
lawn, but neighbors may see the implicit admonition as an update on
the local default norms.
The increasing amount and visibility of foreclosure may affect
an individual homeowner's decisionmaking in a couple of ways. Most
02
straightforwardly, cooperation and selfishness are catching.1
Whether or not a given person chooses to contribute to the common
good or to free ride on the efforts of others depends on what his
friends, colleagues, neighbors, and acquaintances choose. Social
contagion effects have been specifically observed in the mortgage
context. Economists Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales
used survey data to study the effect of social norms and moral

100. Robert Cialdini, A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling the Concept of Norms
to Reduce Littering in Public Places, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1015, 1016 (1990)
(reporting the results of an experiment in which researchers observed participants' choice to
litter or not to litter in an empty room that was either clean or covered in paper).
101. Robert Cialdini, CraftingNormative Messages to Protect the Environment, 12 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 105, 105 (2003) ("Vithin the statement 'Many people are doing this
undesirable thing' lurks the powerful and undercutting normative message 'Many people are
doing this.' ").

102. See James Fowler & Nicolas Christakis, Cooperative Behavior Cascades in Human
Social Networks, 107 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 5334, 5334 (2010) (reviewing evidence on the
contagion-like spread of choices in a cooperative game).
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intuitions on strategic default. 10 3 They found that the most important
variables in predicting strategic default were moral and social
considerations. People who knew someone else who had defaulted
were eighty-two percent more likely to report that they would default
themselves, and the authors speculated that they observed a social
contagion effect.
Social contagion theory explains this pattern by positing a
causal relationship between my friend's behavior and my own. That is,
I observe my friend's behavior and I copy it, either because I
understand her behavior to represent a norm to which I wish to
adhere or because I feel some kind of more basic instinct for
mimicry. 10 4 Social contagion research does not specify a mechanism for
transmission, but it offers evidence that the phenomenon of
interpersonal transmission of behaviors exists across a range of
domains. The mechanism of social contagion in strategic default is
unclear. One possibility is that the social stigma itself decreases when
foreclosures become more common. Stigma depends, to some extent,
on rarity. If a neighborhood is filled with foreclosure signs, then the
stigma is diffused. When the incidence is high, too, it becomes more
difficult to blame foreclosure on specific deviant traits in the
individual families and easier to attribute the phenomenon to broader
social factors like unemployment. It could also be that people begin to
wonder whether the promise-keeping norm exists at all; when they
look around and see foreclosure signs everywhere, they may think
that their previous understanding of the community norm was simply
mistaken.
The other way we might conceptualize the shifting norm is not
so much that the norm of honoring the mortgage contract erodes, but
that the norm of acting in one's own self-interest grows stronger when
one sees others defaulting all around. In New York Times coverage of
defaulters, a reporter wrote that walking away is "no cause for
embarrassment. Rather the opposite: it shows savviness." 10 5
Psychologists refer to this phenomenon-the social approval of selfinterested behavior-as the "norm of self-interest." 10 6 People fear not
only that they will be vulnerable to economic exploitation but that by
behaving nonselfishly, others will think them foolish and naive.
Psychologists Dale Miller and Rebecca Ratner have argued that self103. Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, Moral and Social Constraintsto Strategic
Default on Mortgages 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15,145, 2009).
104. Fowler & Christakis, supra note 102, at 5335.
105. David Streitfeld, When Debtors Decide to Default, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2009, at WK6.
106. See Dale Miller, The Norm of Self-Interest, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1053, 1053 (1999).
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interest is not only powerful in and of itself, but it is also an important
motive because of the normative expectations attached to it.107
Western cultures in particular appear to espouse the view that selfinterest ought to matter. Americans, for example, volunteer and
contribute to charity at very high rates. When asked why, though,
they almost always cite a self-interested reason, even one as lame as
108
"[i]t gave me something to do."
The norm of self-interest argues that it is embarrassing to
cooperate only to find out that you are the only person toeing the line.
If a homeowner thinks that default is morally wrong, but realizes that
others are profiting from default, then he may be unwilling to play the
sucker, contributing to the public good while others walk away scotfree. When enough people start to default on their loans, the people
holding their mortgages, dutifully paying while their neighbors and
their banks make money, start to feel like dupes. Even people who
believe that it is morally wrong to default may begin to feel stupid as
others around them walk away.
A. Study 3: Shifting Moral Norms
In the study presented here, I explored two relationships not
fully explicated by the Guiso et al. study. That study used existing
data and found strong associations, though not necessarily causal
links, between moral and social norms and likelihood to default.
The first hypothesis is that there is a causal relationship
between the social norm and the moral norm-that is, that visible
increases in the foreclosure rate weaken the moral constraints around
default. Guiso et al. found that people who reported that it was
immoral to default were seventy-seven percent less likely to report
that they would do so. The authors did not, however, observe any
relationship between knowing a defaulter and holding a prodefault
moral belief. My prediction is that changes in the social and economic
context do affect moral values.
This study also tests the causal relationship between observing
other foreclosures and increasing one's willingness to enter
foreclosure. The broad prediction here is that seeing others walk away

107. See id.; see also Dale Miller & Rebecca Ratner, The DisparityBetween the Actual and
Assumed Power of Self-Interest, 74 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 53, 53 (1998) (reporting results of
experiments showing that people overestimate the influence of financial reward on peers'
decisionmaking).
108. Miller, supranote 106, at 1057.
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from their homes or enter foreclosure makes foreclosure less morally
problematic and, in turn, more attractive.
1. Method
Participants read the facts of a hypothetical strategic default
decision and were asked to indicate their moral beliefs about default
and their willingness to default. As in Studies 1 and 2, online
participants read an underwater mortgage scenario in one of two
conditions, Rare Foreclosure or Frequent Foreclosure. 10 9 They read
first that their local newspaper recently carried a story about the
housing market, including the following passage:
Rare Foreclosure Condition: The state Department of Housing has released a report on
state of in home foreclosures in our area. In this county, only 1 in 200 homes is currently
in foreclosure proceedings. The sight of foreclosure signs on lawns is still very rare.
FrequentForeclosure Condition: The state Department of Housing has released a report
on the recent increase in home foreclosures in our area. In this county 1 in 10 homes is
currently in foreclosure proceedings. In some neighborhoods, nearly half of the homes
have foreclosure signs on the lawn."
Both Conditions: Now please imagine yourself in the following situation. You bought
your home in 2005 for $400,000 on an interest-only, non-recourse loan. A non-recourse
loan means that if you stop making mortgage payments, the bank will take back your
house, but it will not be able to come after you for the balance of what you owe. The
consequences of defaulting on your mortgage would be that the bank takes your house,
and your credit rating would take a hit. Right now you owe the bank $400,000, but you
know that it is worth much less in the current housing market. You are employed and
you are able to make your monthly payments. You know that you would save money if
you walk away from your home and voluntarily enter foreclosure proceedings.

As in the previous studies, subjects then answered the WTD
question and a question about the morality of default. Using the same
data collection method outlined in Study 1 (though not using precisely
the same group of respondents), I collected responses from one
hundred subjects, including sixty-six women. Ages ranged from
twenty-one to seventy, with a median age of forty. Subjects were paid
two dollars for their participation.
2. Results
There was no within-subjects difference on the morality
response, meaning that subjects did not report an explicit belief that

109. The study is available at MORTGAGES & FLOORS (MORT1), http://finzi.psych.upenn.edu/
-baron/ex/tess/mort1.htm. The data file is also publicly available at http://finzi.psych.upenn.edu/
-baron/R/tess/mort 1.data.
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the social facts would change their moral views. 110 However, there was
a substantial between-subjects difference. Subjects in the Rare
Foreclosures condition rated default as 6.6 on a ten-point scale, while
those who saw the Frequent Foreclosure condition rated default at 5.3
on the scale."' This result tests the difference between one half of the
subjects who read the Rare condition first and the other half of the
subjects who read the Frequent condition first. This finding suggests
that even though most subjects did not think that the frequency of
foreclosures would matter to their moral views, they were actually
quite influenced by the condition that they saw first.
The WTD difference across conditions was significant within11 2
subjects, and the trend was in the same direction between-subjects.
The correlation between moral wrongness and willingness to default
was high and statistically significant at 0.318.113
These results support the contention that when people perceive
foreclosure to be common, they are less sure that default is morally
wrong. Walking away goes from clearly in the "wrong" end of the
spectrum to hovering over the middle-mark, whether or not the
individuals themselves are aware of their changing moral views.
These results speak to the bi-directional flow of causation between
social and moral norms. The social norm of not defaulting is probably
caused in some respects by moral condemnation of foreclosure. But the
converse is also true-when the social norm erodes, the moral norm
follows suit.

VI. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
In this Article, I do not take a strong position on the question of
whether or not individual homeowners ought to default on their
mortgages. Brent White, however, has argued forcefully that strategic
default is not only permissible, but can be a moral good. 11 4 He argues
that homeowners who decide against default, even in the face of huge
savings, are essentially transferring wealth from their children (or
their parents or any other potential local beneficiary of the savings) to

110. Within-subjects results are statistically more sensitive to small differences. However, if
subjects do not consciously believe that the social norm ought to affect the moral norm, they
should show no within-subjects response to the manipulation.

111. t=2.236, df=96.652, p=0. 0 277.

112.
common
113.
114.

A given subject reported willingness to default at a home value 2.8% higher in the
foreclosure condition than in the rare foreclosure condition. t=1.959, dr=99, p=0.053 .
t=4.721, df=198, p <0.0001
White, supranote 44, at 1023.
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their lenders. For the individual with an underwater mortgage,
default is often the wealth-maximizing choice. On the other hand,
mass default will have a negative effect on the American economy. At
the very least, it is clear that foreclosures impose externalities at both
the local and global levels. Economists have estimated that each
foreclosure in a neighborhood brings down nearby property values by
as much as nine percent. 115 Abandoned homes also pose annoyances
and real dangers to others, in the form of overgrown vegetation;
breeding pests; the potential for squatters; open pools and other
hazards to children; and the aesthetic harms of houses that are not
116
kept up.
The claims I make here about the policy implications of the
findings described above assume a fairly modest normative
proposition about homeownership: what is good about homeownership
is the stability it engenders. Owning a home is not inherently
preferable to renting one; from the point of view of the social good,
home ownership is valuable if it increases the returns on a family's
investments in its property, in its neighborhood, and in its community.
A. Securitization
The bundling, trading, selling, and transferring of loans has
meant cheaper credit and more homeownership. This has been a
positive development for many Americans. On the other hand, a
growing body of evidence suggests that securitized loans have higher
default rates. 117 The research I have presented here suggests that the
assignment of a contract, including securitization, may undermine the
promisor's commitment to performance.
Thinking about the role of moral norms and mortgage contracts
may help to recast some of the debate over securitization of mortgages.
Criticism of securitizing mortgage loans has been aimed at the

115. Zhenguo Lin, Eric Rosenblatt & Vincent W. Yao, Spillover Effects of Foreclosures on
Neighborhood Property Values, 38 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 387, 389 (2007) (citing results from
an economic study suggesting that with a small radius and within five years, foreclosures can
depress neighborhood property values by as much as 8.7% per foreclosure).
116. See, e.g., David Streitfeld, Blight Moves in After Foreclosures,L.A. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2009,
at Al ("Stagnant swimming pools spawn mosquitos, which carry the potentially deadly West Nile
virus. Empty rooms lure squatters and vandals. And brown lawns and dead vegetation are
creating eyesores in well-tended neighborhoods.").
117. See, e.g., Cem Demiroglu & Christopher James, Works of Friction? Originator-Sponsor
Affiliation and Losses on Mortgage-Backed Securities (AFA 2012 Chicago Meetings Paper, Jan.
21, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1787813.
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complexity of the various relationships and obligations that ensue. 118
Commentators have argued that we need more regulation in this area
because markets cannot deal efficiently with such byzantine contracts
being bought and sold by parties with distorted incentives.11 9 My
analysis argues for a shift in perspective. The emphasis on complexity
relies on the assumption that the mortgage contract market is
populated entirely by rational, profit-seeking actors. In most securities
contexts, this is sensible-securities are tools for investors, companies,
and other commercial actors. Mortgages are a different case, though.
Homeowners are moral agents who do not think of the loan contract as
an investment tool; they think of it as a promise to repay.
When mortgage contracts are securitized, the act of
securitization has a psychological effect. Selling off pieces of the loan
to investors affects the value of the loan because it changes how the
borrower conceives of her debt obligation. Borrowers move from a
trust framework to an economic framework, and with less trust comes
more default. Securitization makes homeowners less likely to
understand their mortgage contracts (if the complexity has been a
problem for investors and regulators, then it is even more intractable
for parties without degrees in finance) and less likely to trust their
lenders.
B. Modification
One of the practical consequences of increased securitization is
the constrained ability of lenders to modify mortgage loans.
Securitizing mortgages means that lenders often have obligations to
holders of the securities that make them less flexible when faced with
a homeowner in distress. This is troubling because refusal to modify
may itself encourage default. Psychology research suggests that people
who would otherwise walk away may be more willing to remain in a
home with a modified loan, even one that is still more expensive than
a comparable rental. People given the option to modify even a bit may
be less likely to walk away than people not given the chance at all.
When lenders modify, they are signaling a different kind of
relationship to their borrowers. Their action makes them seem more
reasonable and thus more deserving of trust and of reciprocity than
118. Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 93, at 1078-79.
119. See, e.g., Steven Schwarcz, The Future of Securitization, 41 CONN. L. REV 1313, 1325
(2009) ("Whether securitization will remain vibrant and inventive in the long term ...will turn
our ability to better understand the problems of complexity, which was at the root of many of the
failures that gave rise to the subprime crisis.").
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one who refuses to negotiate. Refusal to negotiate or modify based on a
broad policy means saying to customers that the individual
circumstances are irrelevant and denying them an opportunity to be
heard. Like the players in an Ultimatum Game, those homeowners
have no recourse but to walk away. 120 This analysis supports the
approach to modification outlined by Eric Posner and Luigi Zingales in
2009, in which banks would write down principal and receive in
return an equity interest in the house. The authors of that plan offer a
detailed analysis of the economic and political feasibility of such a
regime; I would argue that its appeal to commonsense fairness norms
would yield additional benefits for the public trust. This kind of
burden- and benefit-sharing plan offers immediate relief to
homeowners. It may also offer expressive benefits, a sense of
reciprocity, and the opportunity to fulfill their self-identified moral
obligations without feeling like chumps.
Different policies may be appropriate for homeowners and
speculators. States like California already make distinctions between
loans for a primary residence and loans for developers, house-flippers,
and vacation property owners. 12 1 This is sensible insofar as those are
cases in which the social benefit of the activity has the same kind of
social benefit as any commercial loan. The economic gains from those
businesses are not to be discounted, but calibrating the appropriate
flow of credit to real estate speculators is arguably a calculation best
left to the market. Furthermore, there is reason to think that
borrowers in those cases are more likely to make a straightforward
cost-benefit determination when they decide whether or not to make
payments on a loan rather than engaging in comparisons of moral
culpability as between borrower and lender.
CONCLUSION

The set of hypotheses tested in the studies presented here
address the broad question of how the changes in lending and
foreclosing practices have affected the way that homeowners make
decisions. Borrowers are sensitive to being punished for their own bad
bets while the banks get bailed out, and they feel less morally
obligated to a bank that they perceive as greedy or exploitative. When
lenders sell mortgage loans to one another, there are substantial
efficiency gains, but the transfers also remind homeowners that they

120. See supra Part III.A.
121. See CAL. C1V. PROC. CODE § 580(a) (West 1980).
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are fungible entities rather than trusted counterparties. Borrowers
with fewer moral qualms about default are more likely to choose to do
so if the economic factors point in that direction. And, in turn, as more
homeowners default, strategically or desperately, the moral
constraints around default loosen. These kinds of considerations have
real implications for how banks structure their lending and interact
with their customers, how lenders and homeowners negotiate and
draft mortgage contracts, and how the government regulates the
mortgage industry.

